Philosophy of science, with special consideration given to behaviorism as the philosophy of the science of behavior

Authors

  • John C. Moore University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Author

Keywords:

philosophy of science, logical positivism, operational definition, intervening variable, hypothetical construct, mediational neobehaviorism, radical behaviorism

Abstract

The philosophy of science is the branch of philosophy that critically examines the foundations, assumptions, methods, products, and implications of the activity called science. The present sketch reviews the historical development of the philosophy of science, representative individuals in the field, and topics of longstanding interest. The sketch is intended to prepare readers for subsequent discussions on behaviorism, cognitive psychology, and the meaning of mental terms

Author Biography

  • John C. Moore, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

    Ph.D. (Philosophy)

References

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[4]. Bridgman, P. W. (1927). The logic of modern physics. New York: Macmillan

[5]. Carnap, R. (1936). Testability and meaning. Philosophy of Science, 3, 419– 471.

[6]. Carnap, R. (1937). Testability and meaning—continued. Philosophy of Science, 4, 1–40.

[7]. Feigl, H. (1967). The “mental” and the “physical.” Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

[8]. Flanagan, O. (1991). The science of the mind (2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT Press.

[9]. Fodor, J. A. (1968). Psychological explanation. New York: Random House. GARDNER, H. (1985). The mind’s new science. New York: Basic Books.

[10]. Harré, R. (2001). Cognitive science: A philosophical introduction. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

[11]. Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[12]. Maccorquodale, K., & Meehl, P. (1948). On a distinction between hypothetical constructs and intervening variables. Psychological Review, 55, 95–107.

[13]. Meehl, P. (1967). Theory-testing in psychology and physics: A methodological paradox. Philosophy of Science, 34, 103-115.

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Published

2024-05-20

Issue

Vol. 3 No. 2 (2024)

Section

Articles

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Copyright (c) 2024 John C. Moore (Author)

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